Challenges to Defence Sector Reform in Post-Assad Syria

DSR is a complex, political, and long-term process. It requires a tailored approach based on local conditions, as there is no universal blueprint or model for success. The challenges to DSR are significant. The process is inherently costly, which can undermine reform efforts. Resistance from armed groups poses another obstacle, as DSR threatens their vested interests or aligns with an authoritarian approach to defence, particularly in nations emerging from authoritarian rule. External powers can also hijack reform processes for geopolitical gain, further complicating efforts. These dynamics are all clearly visible in Syria today.

Tensions Between the SDF and HTS

Ahmed al-Shaara, the Chief of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the de facto ruler of Syria, maintains good relations with many armed groups inside the country. However, these relationships are shaped by complex dynamics. For instance, the relationship with the SDF is particularly tense, despite their shared objective of a unified Syria.

On 30 December 2024, General Mazlum Abdi, leader of the SDF, met Ahmed al-Shaara for the first time since HTS assumed power. Their discussion focused on military issues, including the potential integration of the SDF into an HTS-organised military. For the SDF, such a scenario would require extensive negotiations within the larger political system of the new Syria.

General Abdi has repeatedly highlighted the uniqueness of the SDF’s self-governance experience since 2015. While stressing his commitment to a unified Syria during an interview with Al-Arabiya, Abdi stated that the SDF ultimately seeks to become part of Syria’s defence forces. However, he also emphasised the need to preserve the SDF’s distinctive governance model. Abdi proposed a decentralised administration while expressing readiness for the SDF to integrate into Syria’s Ministry of Defence as a unified bloc, provided they are not disbanded.

External Stakeholders and Their Influence

The SDF occupies a contentious position in regional geopolitics. The United States views the SDF as a critical ally in the fight against ISIS, while Türkiye considers it an existential threat due to alleged links between the SDF’s YPG component and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK has been engaged in an armed struggle against Turkish rule since its establishment in 1978.

The SDF’s proposal for integration has already been rejected by the interim government. Murhaf Abu Qasra, appointed Defence Minister on 21 December 2024, has insisted that integration must follow the Ministry of Defence’s hierarchy, with SDF forces dispersed throughout the military. Abu Qasra blamed the SDF for stalling DSR efforts, stating that their inclusion in the national military is a “right of the Syrian state”. He has ambitiously pledged to unify Syria’s fragmented anti-Assad armed factions under a central command by 1 March 2025, coinciding with the end of the interim government’s term.

The Battle for Land and Influence

The SDF and HTS-led interim government are also locked in a struggle for territorial control. The SDF-administered areas, home to approximately 250,000 civil servants, including 40,000 schoolteachers, reflect the region’s ethnic and political diversity. General Abdi has emphasised the importance of preserving their rights. However, HTS offensives have targeted SDF-held areas, such as Tal Rifaat in the Aleppo region, leading to clashes with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). Fighting near the Tishreen Dam has also escalated after SNA forces attempted to recover the bodies of their fallen fighters.

Türkiye has resumed airstrikes on SDF-held areas after a hiatus since 2019, adding to the instability. The SDF had already withdrawn from Manbij, but clashes in key areas continue, reflecting the volatile and fragmented nature of the conflict.

The Path Forward

The evolving geopolitical landscape has placed both the SDF and the HTS-led interim government in precarious positions. The future of their relationship—and of Syria’s defence sector—depends on their ability to navigate these tensions, and to prevent external powers from hijacking it.

To move forward, the international community must support efforts to organise a transformative, inclusive national dialogue conference. Such a platform is crucial for determining the future of Syria’s state institutions, defence forces, and the process of refugee return.