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Military institutions are often depicted as conservative, resisting change for reasons that are sentimental and social rather than strategic.  The Admiralty has frequently been criticised on these grounds, not least for its continued attachment to the battleship during and after the Second World War.  Received wisdom holds that the Admiralty clung to the battleship long after it had ceased to have any utility; that the battleship finally disappeared because it had become prohibitively vulnerable; and that this decision had to be imposed on the Admiralty by more enlightened civilians.  As this presentation will argue, each of these propositions is wholly and demonstrably false.  In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Admiralty retained a small and declining number of battleships on the basis of sound analysis showing that they retained a role which no other capability could yet take over.  At the same time, however, it not only set out the circumstances under which this would no longer be the case (when other capabilities could take over the role), it also worked hard to bring them about.  The final demise of the battleship in the Royal Navy resulted from the same unsentimental analysis, over the objections of politicians.  The presentation will then draw some wider conclusions about the Royal Navy and innovation.