First, let’s talk about money:
The Conservatives and Labour have recommitted to a return to spending the UN aid target of 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) as soon as UK finances “allow.” And there’s the rub. Over the parliamentary term of five years, the tests for this will almost certainly not be met, nor would they have been in any of the last 20 years). Therefore, not surprisingly, manifestos are vague on the timeline. The current spend is 0.58 percent of GNI (£15.4 billion a year), which is above the OECD DAC average. However, it’s notable this number includes a £2 billion boost, allocated by the Chancellor to help cover elevated refugee costs.
Not much is said about the fact that over half of all UK bilateral aid is now spent in the UK. Over £4 billion, or almost 30 percent of the total UK aid budget is being spent on refugee housing costs. With small boat crossings rising again, and no clear plan to reduce costs (Labour dropped plans to allow asylum applicants to work after six months in line with many other countries approach), this will be an ongoing problem. Although in-donor refugee costs can be included as ODA it is not really in the spirit of “aid”. If we discount this spend, more than an extra £7 billion per year is needed to get to 0.7 percent of GNI. That would be made up of £4.3 billion replacing budget currently being used up by refugee costs, plus an extra £3.2 billion to get to 0.7.
Each of the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party have pledged 0.7 percent of GNI on aid spending in their manifestos, with the Greens pledging one percent. If any of these parties find themselves in a coalition, there is potential for a rise. Conversely, Reform have pledged to halve the aid budget.
If UK ODA spend isn’t increased what would be the implications? It could mean efforts to ensure the spending that is available for ODA is refocussed on the poorest countries or conflict-affected places, but it could also mean more attention to policy coherence (arguably a much tougher thing to do, e.g., debt rules in the city of London, tax havens and trade policy).
Second, ministries:
Will the UK resurrect the former Department for International Development in a DFID2.0?
Many have commented on the demise of DFID, merged with the Foreign Office in 2020. The Independent Commission on Aid Impact, for example, noted that the merger had led to a dominant foreign policy culture, and a loss of DFID expertise, a decline in transparency, less focus on evidence, a reduced culture of internal challenge, and the risk of a large-scale loss of institutional memory. Staff engagement tanked following the merger and is only just now recovering.
The Conservatives would continue with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) as it is. Only the Liberal Democrats commit to re-establishing an independent DFID 2.0. Labour say they will “strengthen” development work within the FCDO. This could imply a more radical revamped ministry, as some have proposed along the lines of a ministry for international affairs. That would certainly link to the more geopolitical era the world currently sits in. Alternatively, it could mean that the FCDO simply has a stronger development angle within it, such as a commitment to cross-government coherence and ownership. Or, it could go a step further and establish an independent development agency with policy and implementation, but within the FCDO. This approach would establish a degree of freedom from foreign policy. It’s not clear which Labour is edging towards.
The Conservatives seem to have committed to the international development minister continuing to attend cabinet, as is currently the case (in fact Andrew Mitchell also has the title of Deputy Foreign Secretary). Labour is almost in the same place on this. Though it’s not included in their manifesto, this letter from Shadow minister Lisa Nandy, released after the manifesto was published, states that “a Minister in Cabinet will lead on development within the FCDO.”
Third, motives (and thus, vision):
How might the motives or drivers and thus the vision of UK development policy change? There does seem to be some clear water between parties in the sense at the Conservatives want to add a UK-first proviso that all aid spending would meet a new “national interest test”, though they haven’t said what this may entail. There is also a pledge to a new “Soft Power Strategy”, again this isn’t defined, but presumably these policies are to appeal to an aid-sceptical audience—as Reform have by saying they want to cut UK aid by half.
The Conservatives also say they would push for debt relief, build on the recent FCDO White Paper, and—–at odds with the conditions around national interest laid out above—focus on poverty and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), supporting marginalized groups, gender equality, and global health and contributing to climate finance. And support the BBC World Service.
Labour adopt not the UK-first rhetoric but instead place emphasis on global leadership through the multilateral system and respect, partnership and common interests with the Global South. This could be significant, as the new European Commission leans right, populist sentiments in many countries continue to grow and, in the US, too, if Trump is elected in November.
Soft power also gets a mention though with reference to cultural institutions (Sounds like the BBC again). Policy priorities similarly include promoting economic development, addressing debt, reducing conflict, ensuring climate finance, and gender equality.
In terms of global leadership, the Liberal Democrats actually go further, saying they will restore the UK reputation as a development “superpower” and that gender equality will be at the “heart” of foreign policy.
So, in conclusion, meh?
Will anything change by that much? Reading the manifestos there is almost a sense that there is a template for the manifesto section on development policy. It goes something like this: say something about recommitting to 0.7 but don’t say when; say something on poverty, SDGs, gender equality, climate and conflict; and finish by saying it’ll all be effective, transparent and value-for-money.
Outside the sanitized world of manifestos many ideas are bubbling but who knows for sure what will come to fruition.
Given that money is tight, less focus on aid spending and more focus on policy, its coherence and global leadership might be politically astute priorities for the next government.
A longer version of this blog is posted on the Centre for Global Development.
Many thanks to Ian Mitchell and Maya Verber for comments and inputs.