Many in China would say that this election is an internal affair of the US. Yet, if one asked Chinese strategy-makers what the future of US foreign policy is, they would probably respond that the future is already here. To them, it would not make a substantial difference who wins or lose, because in any case China will continue to be seen as the main threat to US’ interests.
Until the early days of the Trump administration, China preferred a Democrat at the White House. Beijing was facing the “fire and fury” of a leader, Trump, with a muscular interpretation of power and who launched a trade war against China. In contrast, the latest Obama administration promoted a “pivot to Asia” as a way of containing China’s geopolitical power, but it remained strategically patient – to some, even dovish. China was able to get away with a militarization of the South China Sea, while neglecting western hopes of a reformed and liberalised economic and political system.
Yet, the Trump administration acted as a catalyst in Washington, D.C.’s views on China, triggering a bi-partisan consensus around a more assertive US’ China policy. This has led to much continuity between the Trump and the Biden administrations. If Trump imposed trade tariffs on China, the Biden administration and Congress have developed a series of sophisticated tools against China, informed by protectionism. In particular, the US has sought exclude China from accessing sensitive technology through the CHIPS and Science Act and the United States Innovation and Competition Act, but also through AUKUS and the semiconductor alliance with Japana and the Netherlands. Biden, furthermore, stated at least three times that the US will defend Taiwan if attacked by China, words that outraged Beijing.
Does Kamala Harris position on China depart dramatically from either Trump’s or Biden’s approach? The Democratic candidate has been cautious about it. Her remarks on China have been in line with those of previous Democratic administrations – when she made the point that protecting interests does not necessarily mean disengaging – and with the long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity of the US. Harris, furthermore, “championed human rights issues involving China on multiple occasions”.
As three prominent Chinese scholars have argued, “rather than offering alternative approaches to their country and the world, the two major U.S. parties both reflect a general approach to China that has emerged in recent years, one that is strongly informed by domestic U.S. political concerns”. If this is the case, the fact that China is “a top foreign policy concern for approximately half of Americans”, suggests that no matter who will be elected, China will be at the centre of the agenda – as in the case of both Trump’s and Biden’s national security strategies, published respectively in 2018 and in 2022. As Chinese observers put it, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris display “different tactics, same aims”.
If one was to speculate, however, there are good reasons for thinking that Trump is Beijing’s slight preference, for two reasons. Firstly, Harris is likely to continue Biden’s strategy of persuading the West to act as a geopolitical bloc against China. This has been a more effective strategy than Trump’s trade war. Instead, a Trump administration may leave some space for flexibility due to Trump’s eagerness to appear as a deal-maker. Secondly, at a time when scholars are arguing that the international order is seeing a return of geopolitical blocs like during the Cold War, a second Trump administration promises to weaken US alliances, and this will be extremely beneficial to China.
China’s relationship with the United States is driven by structural factors which may not be fundamentally changed by whoever becomes President. Through the lens of the US presidential election, China finds itself between a rock and a hard place, and policymakers in Beijing already know this.