This admission sits at the centre of a growing debate in India about the creeping politicisation of its 1.2 million-strong armed forces, raising concerns for an institution that is built to be apolitical.
The puzzle which normally preoccupies scholars of civil-military relations, is how to prevent militaries subverting of political power. And for good reason - the military, after all has the power and capacity to overthrow democratic governments. However, while military coups are a key concern, scholarship focused on this issue is deeply rooted within Western-centric experiences of societies, where civil-military interactions can take place. In states with weaker institutional structures, the concern is instead about the overt politicisation of the military by administrations. This other side of the coin, has not been examined adequately by scholars.
The trend towards politicisation of the military in India is not recent. Since independence in 1947, the Indian military has always been under firm civilian control. However, this relationship has increasingly been dictated by individuals and relationships, rather than set institutional frameworks, such the ministries or departments of defence seen in states like the UK or USA. This has made the military increasingly vulnerable to politicisation, as seen in successive conflicts.
In the First Kashmir War against Pakistan in 1947 for instance, decision-making remained firmly under civilian control. While the military laboured under a shortage of supplies, post-Partition unrest and a rebellion in Hyderabad, escalation in Kashmir was a politically important goal for the civilian leadership. Prime Minister of the day, Nehru, was “absolutely adamant” in his refusal to withdraw from Poonch in Kashmir, overruling the advice of Commanders-in-Chief and senior operational commanders. This trend continued throughout the conflict.
India’s ignominious defeat in the disastrous India-China War in 1962 was another example of a crisis where excessive civilian control over a politicised military rendered the military leadership completely ineffectual, contributing to eventual failure. The lack of effective institutional frameworks to regulate civil-military interaction, coupled with a turbulent relationship between the civilian and military leadership in the late 1950s and early 1960s, helped set the stage for a complete breakdown of civil-military decision-making throughout this war.
The Second Kashmir War in 1965 between India and Pakistan displayed a similar trend of ad hoc decision-making. Individuals and not institutions were the key drivers of civil-military relations. The then Indian defence minister Yashwantrao Chavan set up individual morning meetings with the Service Chiefs to establish a line of communication with the military. Yet this was not supported by any formal institutional framework for civil-military interaction. Additionally, political leaders controlled decision-making during the crisis, including operational decisions, usually considered the preserve of the military in a typical, democratic civil-military arrangement.
Finally, and most strikingly, the 1971 Bangladesh War saw an overt expanding of civilian institutional control during wartime, and a decline in military representation in the highest echelons of crisis decision-making. Civil-military relations in India at this time were particularly complicated—there was no institutional forum for joint, civil-military decision-making at the highest levels. Additionally, paramilitary organisations—often the first port of call when a situation went beyond the control of local law and order forces—firmly remained under direct civilian control, especially under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Furthermore, the committee that took key decisions during the war, the Bangladesh Committee, comprised of a small group of powerful individuals within the Indian civilian hierarchy. Notably, at no point was the army chief included in this body, even on the outbreak of war.
Politicians have exerted increasing control over the military in India, shaping civil-military relations to their preference throughout Indian history. This is however, not just about India. It reveals a deeper problem in the way we think about civil-military relations in democracies.
Traditional, theoretical understandings of civil-military relations are rooted primarily in the European or American experience of armies and systems of governance.
When it comes to states with weaker institutional structures, the lack of robust institutional control on the civil-military dynamic means that it becomes primarily contingent upon the political leadership to give the military space to present their views. The extent of this space, as seen in India, could be at the mercy of individuals and not institutions, thus undermining the military’s effectiveness, as it becomes a tool for politicians to use as they please, rather than the body responsible for state protection.
To help us grapple with problems prevalent in nations with weaker institutional structures, like postcolonial states, there needs to be a shift from focusing only on civilian control over the military, to also look at what controls exist to limit civilian and political power over the military .
We need a re-imagining of the way we conceive of this key relationship in governance. If our understanding of the civil-military relationship doesn’t account for institutionally weak states, militaries risk becoming dangerous tools in the hands of unreliable civilian leaders, as we are seeing happen in Russia today.