There must be an even chance that Donald Trump will win the US Presidential election and there is a significant possibility that a narrow Harris victory will be contested by Trump and his supporters, leading to a period of uncertainty. Trump has vowed to end the war in the period between winning the election and taking up office in January. That is implausible, but even one phone call by the president-elect to Putin could radically alter the mood and Ukraine’s future prospects.
Some observers claim that Trump will be more cautious in practice, but it is always important to listen to what world leaders say about their intentions. In his first term Trump was surrounded by seasoned specialists like National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, Defence Secretary General James Mattis and Chief of Staff General John Kelly. A second term Trump may wish to have more policy independence. His vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance was also quoted as saying “I don’t really care about Ukraine.”
It was Trump’s last administration which negotiated the lamentable Doha Agreement with the Taliban, behind the backs of the Afghan government. When Biden came to power he briefly pondered whether to renegotiate Trump’s deal but decided it was too late. This led to the collapse of the Afghan government and the scenes at Kabul airport in August 2021 which rivalled the fall of Saigon 1975 for chaos and humiliation.
One of the most bizarre aspects of the whole process was that Washington’s European partners just meekly acquiesced to the whole process. Britain had lost 456 soldiers in the campaign but had barely lifted a finger to question the wisdom of the agreement with the Taliban or the planning for withdrawal. This was despite what Whitehall knew would happen to women’s rights, to counter-terrorist capabilities and the likelihood of mass migration.
The same cannot be allowed to happen over Ukraine. Afghanistan may be a ‘far off country’ but Ukraine is in the heart of Europe with borders with EU and NATO members.
What can Europe do to ensure continued support for Ukraine under a Trump presidency?
The first requirement is to ensure that there are already functional communication channels to Trump. Boris Johnson’s meeting with him was a positive step as Johnson, whatever his other faults, has been a firm friend of Ukraine. He emerged with the impression that Trump may be more reasonable than his public statements imply.
The second imperative is to act fast after the election on 5 November. As the new president takes office on 20 January 2025, Trump, if elected, could do severe damage to Ukraine’s prospects, depending to some extent on which parties control the two houses of Congress. However, he could also do substantial harm in November. This argues for Europe deciding on a game plan to be implemented from 6 November (when the winner should be known).
The third is to decide who should speak for Europe. The obvious candidates are President Macron of France, Chancellor Scholz of Germany and Prime Minister Starmer, but the addition of the right-wing Prime Minister Meloni of Italy would add a great deal of credibility (in Trump’s eyes) to an otherwise soft-left line-up. And Prime Minister Tusk of Poland would represent a country where defence spending is heading towards 5% of GDP.
The fourth and most important point is to decide on Europe’s offer. The most convincing way to change Trump’s mind would be for Europe to shoulder a greater proportion of the collective burden. Europe will still need US assistance (for example in intelligence and heavy lift air transport), but it should be able to commit to do far more on ammunition and missile provision. This might mean raising defence spending across EU and NATO countries and facing down opposition from countries like Turkey, Hungary and Slovakia.
It is hard to exaggerate the urgency of doing this thinking and contingency planning now and not waiting until it is too late. Reaching agreement between 32 NATO members and 27 EU nations would normally take far longer than the six weeks available before the US election.
There should be an important role for Britain which has long seen itself as a bridge between Europe and the US. As a staunch supporter of Ukraine along with Poland, Scandinavia and the Baltic States, the British government needs to stiffen the resolve of less convinced countries to the south and east. Recent elections in France and Germany have left Scholz and Macron feeling less secure than before.
Kamala Harris may well win the election and the instinct in Europe will be a sigh of relief and a return to complacency. This was the reaction when Congress finally passed the $61 billion assistance bill in April 2024.
However, depending on the make-up of Congress, it is possible that a President Harris will find it difficult to provide sufficient support for Ukraine. Europe needs to step up now and demonstrate the political and economic determination to do more.
This is not to rule out peace talks at some stage, but Europe needs to be fully involved in any discussions and Ukraine must be enabled to negotiate from a position of military and territorial strength.
Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Visiting Professor at King’s College London and a former senior British diplomat. A lightly edited version of the following article appeared in The Scotsman on 24 September 2024 under the title 'UK must urgently prepare for Trump selling out Ukraine to Putin'.