With the exception of the recent freeze of the Nord Stream 2 – Russia’s direct gas export pipeline to Germany that circumvents Ukraine – so far, the sanctions have aimed at a delayed, rather than an immediate impact on Russia’s energy. In particular, by restricting Russia’s energy actors’ access to exploration technology, foreign capital, services and information exchange and other forms of involvement from Western companies in some of Russia’s technologically demanding energy projects, they have posed challenges to Russia’s potential to increase its energy (especially oil) output. If the West continues to follow a strategy aiming at a delayed impact on Russia’s energy sector development, it might try to further hamper its ability to adapt to the global energy changes by targeting Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) and hydrogen programmes.
It is difficult to monitor and measure the effectiveness of the sanctions on Russia’s energy sector: energy dynamics are sensitive to a wide range of factors, such as resource prices fluctuations, multi-lateral arrangements (e.g., OPEC+) and the global clean energy transition initiatives. Additionally, Russia’s energy sector can suffer from indirect consequences of non-energy sanctions that make doing business with Russian oil and gas risky for shipping and insurance companies.
Nevertheless, in combination with the existing energy market pressures, further sanctions affecting Russia’s LNG and hydrogen initiatives would inevitably challenge Russia’s place on the global energy stage. However, they could also affect the interests of foreign companies involved in Russian LNG projects and hamper Russia’s attempts to transition towards potentially cleaner energy exports, such as hydrogen.