How should a new government approach a post-election defence review?
Paul Rimmer CBE: “Whoever wins today’s election will quickly find that defence is expensive. There is pressure to increase defence spending as a percentage of GDP, as well as to invest in the NHS, tackle immigration and address the myriad other high-priority issues that will demand their attention.
“A defence review is simply a process whereby the government considers and sets out its overall defence (and, if part of a broader national security review, its wider national security) priorities, together with the means and resources to achieve them. The UK published an ‘Integrated Review’ and an accompanying MOD Command Paper ‘Defence in a Competitive World’ in 2021, followed by a ‘Refresh’ in 2023 responding to ‘a more contested and volatile world.’ So, there is no lack of recent material for an incoming government to draw on in framing its defence priorities.
“Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey and his team will have been undertaking research, getting briefings from informed commentators and, through the process of permitted contact with government departments ahead of an election, informing senior MOD officials of their thinking. Those MOD planners won’t have been sitting on their hands either, drawing on those contacts and existing knowledge of threats, the international environment, priorities and concerns.
“A defence review will not be undertaken from a standing start and I would suggest five overriding requirements. The first is to make it quick; a long-drawn-out process is not required and some decisions (such as the continuing level of military support to Ukraine) need to be made fast.
“Second, make it truly strategic; too often, governments seem unable to see beyond the lifetime of the current Parliament. Defence is a serious subject with long timescales, especially for some aspects of equipment procurement.
“Third, make its priorities honest; don’t aspire to do everything, make a valuable contribution where it counts. Fourth, make allies count; there’s not much we would expect to do alone.
“Finally, make it financially honest; ambition will inevitably have to be trimmed to meet the hard realities of the budget. Experience shows that defence budgets can be seriously affected by unexpected commitments and programme growth. Don’t fudge, obfuscate, or imply ‘jam tomorrow’ if it’s not going to happen.”
Paul Rimmer CBE is a visiting professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Paul is a former Senior Civil Servant in the Ministry of Defence and was Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence until May 2020. He has 37 years’ experience of operating at the heart of the UK’s national security business.
How can a new government work better with the private sector on defence and national security?
Dr Hugo Rosemont: “Defence industrial policy was never going to feature prominently in the 2024 General Election. As campaign issues go, however, defence and security became more central to proceedings than many expected and some promises for a proper defence industrial agenda were made.
"For the Labour Party, the key commitment, cemented in its election Manifesto, was to bring forward a defence industrial strategy. This is welcome and reflects the reality that private sector engagement in this area of government needs marked improvement. If elected after today’s vote, three immediate priorities should be advanced.
"Firstly, serious questions on UK industrial capacity should be fully addressed as part of the planned Strategic Defence Review (or defence ‘and security’ review if it is constituted more broadly). This would ensure a seamless link between the next government’s overarching strategic posture and its associated industrial priorities, which have become overly detached.
"Second, senior leaders should revisit how the ‘private sector’ is considered across UK defence. The war in Ukraine has shown that defence organisations must now widen the lens of industry engagement. Dialogue with critical infrastructure operators and emerging technology players is now as important as ongoing interaction with the well-known defence industrial base.
"Third, the next government should reboot its structures for delivering public-private security cooperation. For too long, ownership for industrial strategy has been lacking, with the agenda suffering from short termism and a tactical focus. The next administration should allocate formal responsibilities for defence and security industrial engagement to named senior officials.
"The main parties promise more continuity than change on defence and national security. There is a consensus to invest 2.5% of GDP on defence at the earliest moment, with shared commitment to NATO, the nuclear deterrent and the UK’s international campaigns on Ukraine and AUKUS. Less clear, however, is how the next government will work with industry in this area. This policy portfolio needs quick and urgent elevation, followed by nothing short of a major structural upheaval."
Dr Hugo Rosemont is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Outside King’s, he is the Director of Policy and Public Affairs at KBR.
How should a post-election defence review approach UK Air and Space Power?
Dr Sophy Antrobus: “If Labour wins today’s General Election, then we can expect a Defence Review within the year. Air and space power are the first line in the defence of the UK and provide the most agile form of offensive action. The stronger our capability, the better we can deter Russia and other adversaries. The RAF has recapitalised its fleet over the last two decades. Its challenge now is to do more with what it has.
“On the F-35 fighter aircraft, the questions are about how many more (and of which kind) the UK will buy. So far, the UK has committed to the carrier compatible F-35B version, but the range and endurance of the F-35A and its ability to operate more seamlessly with US counterparts makes it an attractive alternative. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a multi-national initiative to develop a ‘sixth generation’ combat air system, aims to deliver by 2035. Given the increasing Russian threat on NATO’s doorstep, that timeframe will prove challenging for a new government.
“Furthermore, Space Domain Awareness capabilities must be further developed and should include some space-based sensors. Space Control – the ability to protect and promote our interests in the domain – must also be enhanced. The UK should move away from relying solely on the US for space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The UK can produce what is needed and this investment would build out the defence industrial base.
“Air and Space Power will only prosper if it can attract and retain skilled personnel. The RAF cannot offer the same pay as the defence industry and the defence industry can’t currently compete with the nuclear industry or the financial sector. Though air and space continue to inspire the next generation, unless the next government tackles woeful problems with MOD accommodation and bureaucracy (see the Haythornthwaite Review), then even if people join, they won’t stay.
“Finally, as I have argued recently, the RAF’s warfighting culture has weakened after years of wars of choice, operating without a challenge to combat air, operating thousands of miles from home and regarding UK bases as peacetime locations. This is exacerbated by a bureaucratic approach that reduces risk appetite and undermines recruitment and retention of the best people. The RAF’s senior leadership recognises this problem. A future Defence Review should engage more with this critical theme.”
Dr Sophy Antrobus is a Research Fellow at the Freeman Air and Space Institute in the School of Security Studies in King’s College London. She researches contemporary air power in the context of the institutional, cultural and organisational barriers to innovation and effectiveness in modern air forces. Prior to her PhD, Sophy served in the Royal Air Force for twenty years, including in Iraq and Afghanistan and a tour with the Royal Navy.