Militarisation, increased repression and decimated spy networks abroad
The Federal Security Service (FSB) – effectively the KGB’s post-Soviet incarnation responsible for civilian and military counterintelligence, counterterrorism as well as border security – has stood at the forefront of Putin’s war on Ukraine. Unsurprisingly then, the invasion has had a profound impact on its mission.
Since the invasion, the FSB became almost fully consumed with the war, adopting an all-hands-on-deck approach. In practice, this means that apart from the two departments traditionally dedicated to Ukraine, today all departments are heavily engaged in supporting the Russian war effort – including the Department of Economic Security, now in charge of helping Russia survive Western sanctions, and the Unit for the Protection of the Constitution recently charged with imposing the appropriate pro-war mood across academia, universities, and schools. The main goal is to ensure the stability of the regime during the biggest crisis Putin has ever faced. The scale of this shift is unprecedented and cannot be compared to previous FSB support in times of crisis or war.
The FSB’s overconcentration on the war in Ukraine has inevitably led to the second key change in the way it operates: the militarisation of Russia’s domestic civilian service. This transformation is perhaps best exemplified by the FSB’s involvement in the so called ‘filtration’ of Ukrainian citizens. Set up either on Russian or occupied Ukrainian territory, many of these facilities – some of which are camps – aim to identify members of Ukrainian armed forces and police, recruit collaborators, extract potentially useful intelligence, and collect ‘testimonies’ about Ukrainian war crimes. Here, FSB officers have been reported to interrogate, torture, take fingerprints, mine personal phones for data, and inspect social media accounts as well as personal messages of Ukrainian civilians. In some cases, Ukrainians are being forced to record disinformation videos accusing Ukrainian neo-Nazi regiments of committing war atrocities.
Overall numbers are hard to establish: State Department figures from July 2022 estimate that between 900,000 - 1.6 million Ukrainians have been interrogated, detained, and forcibly deported by Russian authorities. Ukrainian estimates from December 2022 cite at least 2.8 million people. Although the Security Service engaged in such filtrations in previous conflicts – most recently in the Chechen wars – the scale of its current engagement is unprecedented.
The third transformation of the FSB relates to its operations within Russian borders. Since the outbreak of the war, Putin’s Security Service has been increasingly clamping down on political opposition, dissents and public critics. A growing number of prominent critics of Putin have been incarcerated, mass arrests at demonstrations have shown what will happen to those willing to take to the streets to protest Russia’s war, and new draconian media laws have effectively introduced censorship and landed prominent journalists on the most wanted list or in prison. Although the FSB has been the flagbearer of these oppressive policies from the very beginning, its remit expanded in December 2022, Putin ordered the FSB to step up its surveillance, alleging increased threat from foreign intelligence services and traitors. This could be seen as a step back into the cold, as a return to the era of Stalinesque tactics directed against the population and civil society characterised by increased surveillance, censorship, purges, and large-scale arrests.
It's clear that Russia’s two other key spy agencies – the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and its military equivalent, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) – have suffered significant blows. In the early months of the conflict, Moscow’s intelligence officers were expelled from across European capitals in unprecedented numbers and since the invasion arrests of Russian agents across Europe have notably increased. This does not automatically signal a shift in Moscow’s strategy or scale of operation. In fact, most uncovered assets had been working for Russia well before the invasion. They do, however, show the depth of Russian penetration of numerous strategic and security targets across Europe. It also signals a shift in the mindset of European governments. While for years some states have opted for a softer-touch approach to Russian espionage, recent arrests indicate that those days are a thing of the past.
Intelligence failures and old structures
Amidst all this change, some key characteristics of Russia’s intelligence and security empire remain the same. Crucially, Russian strategic and tactical intelligence analysis seems to be in as dire a state as it was during the Cold War. A year into the conflict in Ukraine, it is increasingly clear that Moscow’s invasion was paved with a variety of policy, military, intelligence failures – ranging from misreading Ukrainian geography and terrain, to misjudging the strength of popular and military resistance. Intelligence failures of such magnitude typically lead to leadership decapitations or institutional shake ups. However, we have not seen any such strategic shifts aimed at punishing or rectifying these blunders. Holding off on such major changes might be a strategic decision on the side of the Kremlin. In an effort not to rock the boat while on rough seas, Putin might be looking to pretend like all is business as usual.
Towards a cultural shift?
While structurally, the Russian security and intelligence apparatus looks much like it did a year ago, the conflict in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the way Putin’s secret state operates. This might facilitate a long-term cultural shift impacting the way the Russian security apparatus will function for decades to come. A transformation that will see Putin’s Security Service regress to the darkest times of Stalin-era repressions.
This feature is adapted from an article published in War in Ukraine: One Year On - a collection of articles from the School of Security Studies to mark the first year of the war.