Trumping NATO: Donald Trump and NATO air power in Europe

As the 2024 US election campaign heats up, prospective Republican candidate Donald J. Trump has once again doubled down on his damning comments toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). At a rally on 10^th February 2024, Trump declared that where NATO allies are “behind” on payments, he would “encourage” aggressors to act as they please, suggesting that the US would not come to the aid of these members in light of aggression. This is problematic for European security, risking undermining NATO’s credibility as a united front and suggesting that the days of steadfast American support to European defence could be numbered. Moreover, Trump’s comments underline the need to address significant shortcomings within the European defence architecture. Gaps in key capabilities that inhibit effective operational capacity are widespread and a longstanding path-dependency on US support in NATO operations persists. In the air domain alone, over 35,000 personnel and 217 US Air Force aircraft are covering the full spectrum of operations. Meanwhile, key European NATO allies have seen significant reductions in their combat aircraft fleet sizes. While Trump’s comments may be coloured with a nationalist spin ahead of an election campaign, several smaller Eastern European allies, such as Lithuania, have articulated a fear that NATO remains “complacent”. This intra-alliance fear and irrefutable evidence of scaling back of European defence infrastructure beyond Trump’s accusations suggest his interpretation may not be as unhinged as it seems. Thus, downscaling European-based US assets will impact credible air power as a European security instrument. Europe’s NATO members must act now to facilitate self-sufficiency among the European Member States, should any US force reduction occur. Realistically, a complete US withdrawal from NATO is “unlikely”, but if the US withdrew any support from NATO, is European Air Power prepared?

Six F-15E Strike Eagles from the 492nd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath taxi to depart on a training sortie in December 2020. Image courtesy of Luca Chadwick.

European Air Domain Shortcomings & Path Dependency

The EU’s longstanding attempt to construct a collective defence and security framework beyond NATO is its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Among other objectives, the CSDP strives to “continuously develop and strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities”. However, the fundamental drawback of this policy is a lack of mobilizable military capability, undermining big-picture European military credibility. Many of the most damaging capability shortfalls are air domain enablers – with air-to-air refuelling, command and control (C2) strategic airlift and strategic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) among those creating the gap. While the CSDP is an EU apparatus, its shortcomings exemplify overall gaps in European air capabilities. This under-equipped status of key European NATO members in the air domain gives leverage to arguments that the Alliance depends on US commitment. Indeed, US capabilities have typically backfilled European allies under the NATO umbrella. Most notably, during Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya in 2011. Despite beginning as a European-led intervention, the campaign saw the coalition request US involvement, drawing on their capabilities extensively, with American tanker aircraft being used to increase the loiter time of Royal Air Force assets. Moreover, “surge” deployments of US Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), C2, ISR and mobility capabilities into the European theatre continue to fill the gaps in European air power – capabilities which European nations continue to lack. While the air campaign in Libya was largely successful in military terms, it would not have been possible without significant US resources, reinforcing a long history of path dependency on Washington that undermines self-sufficiency of European air power.

Thus, being unable to engage on a large scale without US support risks undermining the deterrent credibility of NATO’s European members. They would be unable to fight an all-out war if the US pulled back, particularly when considering the rise of attrition and the diminishing weapons stockpiles. NATO’s European members should, therefore, immediately look towards capability development and proliferation to prepare itself for potential near-peer confrontation in the coming years.

Is Europe Prepared?

It is worrying then that in the years following Libya, there has been little traction in Europe towards bolstering capabilities that are clearly lacking. Most pressing perhaps are limited SEAD capabilities across the continent, despite being integral to achieving air superiority, and maximising operational freedom in the air domain. Evidence from the war in Ukraine has only proved that these capabilities are “essential”.

Though hypothetical, removal of the American capability would almost halve Europe’s capability in this area. With the US election imminent and NATO appearing increasingly fragile as Trump’s campaign continues, if the US were to pull back, long project lead-times to develop fundamental capabilities will only continue to undermine the alliance’s credibility. There is a ‘roadmap’ within NATO to enhance these capabilities and develop a joint NATO SEAD capability. However, even its mid-term goals suggest delivery by 2030, which is too slow. As of 2020, there were only 59 dedicated SEAD aircraft in Europe – 35 German and Italian Tornado ECRs collectively and 24 US F-16CMs based in Germany. Within what European capability does exist, reports show that shortfalls remain in expertise and munitions stocks inhibiting SEAD “at [the necessary] scale”. Short-term solutions are possible, though. Lockheed Martin anticipates that over 550 F-35s will be operational in Europe by 2030. A RUSI report identified several F-35-compatible munitions that are well-suited to SEAD operations; while expensive, the evidence only proves that this would be an effective means to quickly enhance European air power and that relatively fast-paced solutions can be found.

A Luftwaffe Tornado ECR from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 51 returns to RAF Waddington following a sortie during Exercise Cobra Warrior 2022. Image courtesy of Luca Chadwick.

Beyond SEAD, other key areas remain underrepresented within European air power. The UK House of Commons Defence Committee exposed numerous UK-centric shortfalls in their ‘Winging It?’ report. These include a current gap imposed by the premature E-3D withdrawal and its insufficient replacement, with the E-7A order cut from 5 to 3 aircraft leaving an inadequate airborne C2 capability. British air mobility has also taken a significant blow, as the C-130J divestment was declared to have a negative impact on Special Forces operations. This move comes at a time when allies are procuring C-130 airframes to close capability gaps around limited infrastructure airlift operations. Given that identified European capability shortfalls specifically surround C2 and air mobility, Britain’s failure to deliver these core capabilities as a leading NATO Member only has negative implications for the Alliance’s European Member’s overall credibility.

European air power is hence clearly fragmented with comprehensive, determined approaches being made in some cases, such as in Poland and across the Scandic nations, while elsewhere there is more evidence of shortfalls and little of meaningful progress. This points towards fragile NATO air capabilities overall. Hence, if US contributions to European defence were diluted tomorrow, the picture would be bleak for the Alliance’s Air Power capability. Even if this appears unlikely, capability proliferation to ensure European self-sufficiency, alleviating dependency on the US will be extremely beneficial to NATO’s overall fighting capability and deterrent credibility.

A Case for Fourth-Gen

We should consider whether continued F-35 proliferation is a symptom of continued US dependency. However, with over 550 F-35s projected to be operational in Europe by 2030, it is clear the aircraft is now deeply embedded within European strategic culture. Thus, the F-35’s centrality to European air power means any attempts to reinforce Europe by offsetting its significance would undermine its operators’ commitment to modern warfighting, as the type is now the symbol of Fifth Generation combat air on the continent.

Nevertheless, for the UK, there are options for reinforcement that do detract from US-led solutions. For example, the pending divestment of the RAF’s Tranche 1 Typhoons by 2025 could be halted. The divestment would leave just 107 Typhoons operational. However, despite being less capable than Tranche 2 and 3 aircraft, these airframes can still offer useful reinforcement to air defence capabilities –demonstrated by IX (B) Squadron’s deployment to Estonia for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. At a minimum, these aircraft could be mothballed in a capacity similar to the US’ ‘Type 3000 Storage’, where aircraft are held in a semi ‘live’ status, meaning they can be returned to service faster than other stored aircraft. This would facilitate a relatively quick generation of additional capability should the requirement arise.

Germany and Spain have ensured their early Typhoons’ longevity through an upgrade programme or committing to purchase replacement aircraft. Crucially, these approaches ensure that the increasingly critical numbers in air power are not lost and the UK should use these approaches as a model for reinforcing combat air without a heavy reliance on the US. The continued relevance of Fourth Generation capabilities is reflected through France’s recent purchase of 42 additional capability-enhanced, Tranche 5 Rafales. As a cheaper and more readily available option to quickly bolster combat mass, established Fourth Generation platforms such as the Typhoon and Rafale should not be ignored as credible options for a fast-paced capability enhancement in an intensifying security context.

The Typhoon’s continued relevance is also defined in its newfound SEAD role, wherein the Typhoon EK will become a NATO-certified Electronic Warfare platform by 2030, with Germany purchasing 15 aircraft to replace its Tornados. With SEAD shortfalls across Europe, it would be worthwhile for the UK to consider acquiring some Typhoon EKs to assist in bolstering independent European SEAD in the long term.

As programmes to develop a Sixth-Generation fighter progress, refocusing commitment to older, but still extremely capable platforms like Typhoon to augment the F-35 will help maintain the F-35’s relevance while facilitating more efficient numerical reinforcement. The F-35’s capacity for SEAD missions also upholds its relevance in European strategic culture if the onus were to shift in favour of Fourth Generation platforms. With such vast F-35 proliferation across Europe, SEAD integration would offer a realistic short-term solution to Europe’s shortfalls, maintaining the aircraft’s significance. Programmes like FCAS can therefore continue and eventually replace aircraft like the Typhoon, creating indigenous platforms that move European nations away from US dependence and will allow Sixth Generation capabilities to take a new precedent once they come online.

Of course, any moves of this nature will inflict great expenses on NATO allies. Approximately $265 billion (US) worth of aid has been provided to Ukraine throughout the first two years of the conflict, with the UK committing £7.1 billion GBP of military aid since February 2022. European nations should thus be willing to commit their defence budgets to enhancing NATO’s core objective of deterrence, which relies on possessing credible capabilities, while the extent of this has been brought into question. The ongoing war and pervasive threat on NATO’s borders thus means that this expenditure is principal to avoiding any possible escalation given the volatile environment, ensuring that escalation in Europe is not a viable option for Russia at any point. The cost of aid to Ukraine to sustain their war effort at short notice has only demonstrated the worth of longstanding investment in defence apparatuses as if, in a worst-case scenario, conflict escalated then effective deterrent capabilities can be readily translated to effective fighting resources, as opposed to last-minute surges in spending that would not only prove detrimental to economies but ultimately inhibit the warfighting capability of the Alliance.

One of 617 Squadron's F-35Bs lands at RAF Leeming during the Agile Combat Employment element of Exercise Atlantic Trident 2023. Image courtesy of Luca Chadwick.

Conclusions

While the rhetoric of Donald Trump is controversial and problematic, it can be seen as a key to unlock the door to a discussion around whether NATO’s European Members are prepared to tackle current generation threats to security on the continent. Though we are unlikely to see a complete US withdrawal from the Alliance, the tense security environment on the continent, coupled with the enduring Indo-Pacific Tilt in the US means there is significant mileage in assessing European nations’ capabilities independent of Washington. There are significant shortfalls in European air capabilities which could undermine the credibility of the Alliance’s fighting power and have significant implications for NATO’s posture moving forward. This short assessment has shown that capability proliferation and the development of existing capabilities in the air domain is prudent in ensuring that European Member States can uphold the integrity of the Alliance and are able to respond to potential conflicts effectively, particularly amid the rising threat of a war on two fronts. Immediate attention to improving European SEAD capabilities will be extremely beneficial, quickly helping to boost credibility and confidence, particularly by considering the merits of continued proliferation of Fourth Generation platforms.