Forcing Ukraine to seek peace with Russia and Europe to guarantee any agreement between Kyiv and Moscow. Imposing huge tariffs on allies and partners while threatening new one. Essentially ignoring, if not abandoning, the very same liberal institutions that the United States built and led for decades. It is fair to say that the first few months of the second Trump administration have upended long-standing assumptions about the role of the United States as the guarantor of the Liberal International Order set up following the Second World War. The United States and Europe might not have always lived to the rules and expectations of this order, but adherence to its norms and principles was an important element of their foreign policy and security identity and strategy.
And yet, the policies pursued by the Trump administration in the early months of his second mandate could, unexpectedly, serve to build bridges and strengthen ties among a group of like-minded partners across North America, Europe and East Asia. And there is a strong likelihood that the United States will continue to be part of this group of countries, even as it takes a more transactional approach to its foreign security and trade relations.
Long-standing alliances
To begin with, East Asian countries including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are going to boost their own security capabilities but have no intention of abandoning their long-standing alliance—or de facto partnership, in the case of Taiwan—with the United States. This message has come across clearly in recent discussions with policy-makers and defence officials with the three countries. Furthermore, the three of them are understandably rattled by the tariffs imposed by Trump in his so-called ‘Liberation Day’.
But their response is going to include a mixture of the private sector increasing investment in the United States, businesses tightening supply chains and innovation partnerships with US counterparts, and governments seeking to find common ground with the Trump administration’s economic priorities. Whether out of short-term self-interest, a belief in the strong fundamentals of their long-term relationship with the United States or long-standing business-to-business and people-to-people ties, policymakers and businesspeople across East Asia do not want to weaken their relationship with Washington.
At the same time, countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea or Taiwan are seeking new economic and security partners to reduce reliance on the United States and deal with the threat they perceive coming from China.
An important part of my policy and academic work involves analysing and providing advice on Europe-Indo-Pacific relations to governments on both sides of this relationship. The first Trump administration and China’s assertive behaviour under Xi Jinping served to create the conditions to boost ties within frameworks such as the NATO-Indo-Pacific 4 group, the EU’s recently signed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea or strategic partnerships between individual European countries and these like-minded peers in East Asia.
Practical considerations such as a shared wish to diversify trade and investment partners or Europe’s technological lag vis-a-vis Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are also driving forward Europe-Indo-Pacific relations. In conversations with both sides since Trump took office for a second time, it has become clear that this relationship is poised to deepen in the coming months and years.
Greater autonomy
Arguably, the transatlantic relationship is going to be most affected by Washington’s new foreign policy and trade posture. After all, many in Europe would argue that the Trump administration has ‘abandoned’ Ukraine while simultaneously launching a trade war of uncertain consequences.
Having said that, the message coming out of France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom and other European countries is one of more autonomy from the United States—but not a complete break in relations. The close people-to-people, economic, security and political ties binding Europe and the United States together should help ensure that the relationship recovers from its current low.
It is unlikely that the level of understanding and cooperation between the two sides will go back to the highs seen during the Cold War. After all, the United States does not see Russia as a fundamental threat that it believed the Soviet Union was. But a more autonomous and, potentially, assertive Europe has the potential to become an actor that the United States would need to treat as an equal, as opposed to a junior partner in need of Washington’s support. This way, Europe would not be seen as one of the playgrounds in which Sino-American competition plays out, but rather as a player on its own right.
Ultimately, US foreign policy, security and economic elites continue to agree that China is their country’s only real long-term competitor. Beijing, meanwhile, believes that Washington is seeking to prevent its rise to great power status. This creates problems in the relationship between the two countries as well as instability at the global level. And it may well be that Trump himself does not agree with this assessment at a personal level.
But the consequence of this worldview is that US foreign, defence and commerce decisionmakers will seek to find common ground with partners across East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific—and potentially in Europe as well.
Increasing the relevance of the G7
In this context, a growing number of astute policymakers and experts are making the case that the time has come to increase the membership of the G7 to include, at the very least, Australia and South Korea.
The G7 has been losing relevance for years, given its membership skewed towards the transatlantic space and decreasing share of global GDP—at a point in time when the global economic and security centre of gravity has moved towards the Indo-Pacific region. By adding two or potentially even more countries from this region, the G7 would regain some of its lost relevance.
In this way, paradoxically, Trump’s seemingly confrontational policies could open the door to making the G7 great again and build bridges among a group of countries that share interests and goals.