The Secretary of State for Defence has clarified that the ceiling increase was a response to the ‘evolving security environment’ and that it was meant to maintain a credible deterrent vis à vis advances in Russian ballistic missile defence capabilities - although there are many other viable interpretations.
The UK Government maintains that this marginal increase is not in conflict with the UK’s disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) - and with its nonproliferation stance. Despite these assurances, however, third countries – and especially Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) will draw their own conclusions on the move, and their reactions could reduce the UK’s standing to work with third countries on shared non-proliferation goals.
The Integrated Review is itself an element of signalling that the UK directs at both allies and rivals. It brought together many strands of the UK’s foreign and defence policy, and questions of deterrence and military strategy, and of how to best communicate the UK’s deterrent stance to possible nuclear-armed adversaries, were considered in great depth. However, it is likely that in many NNWS governments, and especially in smaller countries that are not directly involved or touched by the UK’s grand strategy, this will be primarily seen as a matter of nonproliferation and disarmament policies, rather than one of nuclear deterrence and defence.
Under Article VI of the NPT, the UK as one of the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), is required ‘to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’ Whether sufficient progress has been made so far, and whether the NWS’ current approaches to nuclear disarmament amount to work in ‘good faith’, however, has been a matter of controversy. Of course, NNWS opinions are divided: most NATO states have remained silent or supportive of the current situation, while other groups, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition, have been vocal in their criticism.
This debate has an impact on global nonproliferation policies, too, as some non-nuclear weapons states have maintained that disarmament and nonproliferation are interlinked, and progress on one end should be matched by progress on the other. In this context, some states and groups have argued that the constant pursuit of higher nonproliferation standards in the face of what is seen as a failure to make progress on Article VI negotiation is an unsustainable and unfair burden that the NWS – which count some of the richest and more powerful countries in the world – are inflicting on the rest of the international community.
NNWS that are critical of the current status quo have increasingly worked to make their voice heard in a range of international fora, including the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee and the NPT Review cycle, and in recent years they have negotiated and brought into force the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which the UK (as well as the other NWS) does not support. The TPNW provides another avenue outside the usual NPT review conference process to register dissatisfaction and advance nuclear disarmament. The NWS have argued that the treaty undermines their security and the global nonproliferation regime, in particular the NPT.
At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the NPT States Parties failed to agree on a consensus document, fuelling perceptions of a gridlocked debate and, potentially, a treaty regime in crisis. The 2020 Review Conference, now set to convene on 4-28 January 2022 after delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, will open to a climate of high expectations and increased polarisation.