Looking back at the Chornobyl disaster, what are the most critical lessons that should guide current nuclear safety protocols and emergency response strategies?
Ross: Chornobyl is an event that completely changed how we do nuclear safety and nuclear security. It sparked a discussion on a wide range of aspects such as evacuation procedures, communication protocols, plant design and training standards.
Immediately, following the incident, critical international instruments were put into place to report nuclear incidents internationally, especially those with potential transboundary consequences. They also emphasised the importance of implementing specific measures to ensure the safety of affected populations. This swift response underscored the need for transparency, clear communication and coordinated action. Chornobyl officials chose to keep the incident a secret. Evacuees were instructed to board buses immediately, leaving behind their personal belongings. Little attention was given to planning for their relocation or addressing the psychological impact of uprooting their lives. The psychosocial impacts have been worse than the health effects of the radiation they would have been exposed to. So, nuclear safety protocols and emergency response strategies have come a long way since then.
The significant improvements in staff training and operating practices have reinforced the message that safety must be the number one priority in everything we do in the nuclear realm. There has also been a much greater development of what we call nuclear security or nuclear safety culture. It must be clear in everybody's mind that safety is the number one concern. However, at the Chornobyl plant, employees were often unable to question their superiors and lacked proper training for assigned tasks. Today, clear protocols are in place, empowering employees to refuse any task they deem unsafe, even if requested by their superiors.
How might the war in Ukraine impact nuclear security considerations, both regionally and globally?
Ross: In today’s context, nuclear security refers to safeguarding nuclear facilities against sabotage and preventing the theft of nuclear material that could be weaponised. Our primary concern is protecting both people and the environment from the risks associated with ionising radiation. However, unlike nuclear safety, we're focused on malicious acts of sabotage, individuals purposefully attempting to cause harm. States with nuclear facilities typically require operators to prepare for a certain level of threat, known as the Design Basis Threat, while the state assumes overall responsibility for nuclear security. Unfortunately, due to security concerns, Design Basis Threat documents are classified.
Regarding the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on nuclear security considerations, there's been significant debate. Firstly, there are discussions about whether nuclear facilities need to defend against state-level threats, such as invading military forces or well-resourced non-state groups. However, integrating such threats into the Design Basis Threat isn't practical; it would essentially turn nuclear facilities into fortresses, rendering them unable to operate due to excessive costs.
Secondly, some actions by Russia during this conflict have raised serious concerns. For instance, there have been threats to use nuclear weapons as a first strike to deter NATO states from supporting Ukraine, as well as the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. These actions are particularly troubling given Russia's status as a Nuclear Weapons State under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its position on the UN Security Council. The perceived success of these threats, alongside other contributing factors, has deterred military intervention by other states in Ukraine.
There have been recent reports of drone strikes at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. What measures are in place to stop a large-scale nuclear disaster from occurring?
Ross: These drone strikes are indeed confusing. Both parties accuse each other, as they have done for all previous attacks on the plant. However, unlike previous attacks, there's a lack of a clearly constructed narrative to explain these events. Neither side appears to have a pre-established explanation readily available, making it more difficult to attribute responsibility. A colleague at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), who closely monitors the situation, suggested to me that these attacks might even be carried out by a third party, such as a splinter faction from either the Russian or Ukrainian forces, operating independently from the state or government direction. It's unclear who is responsible and why they have chosen this moment to act.
In terms of preventing nuclear accidents resulting from these events, similar measures were implemented as those to prevent accidents from shelling in late 2022. A range of measures are always in place at nuclear facilities to ensure nuclear safety and security. We adhere to a defence in depth approach, relying on multiple independent and redundant measures working together to prevent disasters. For example, in nuclear security, we have multiple layers of defence, such as fences, guards, sensors, and hardened buildings with secure doors to protect nuclear material.
Moving on to indirect risks, these include potential damage to systems responsible for cooling the reactor and spent fuel. Damage to power lines, diesel generators, pumps, or waterways could disrupt the cooling process, leading to a buildup of heat within the nuclear material. While damaged cooling systems may not immediately result in a radiation release, it is crucial to respond promptly. We typically have a window of a few hours to a few days to address the issue, during which multiple backup power systems can be activated.
Given the global nature of nuclear technology and its dual-use potential, what should be the priorities for international non-proliferation agreements and policies today?
Ross: I'm personally looking forward to the next generation of nuclear technology and facilities that are being developed. We are currently on the precipice of a potentially significant expansion in the deployment of nuclear power plants worldwide. Various technology developers globally are working on designing and obtaining licenses for a variety of innovative nuclear power plant technologies. These include small modular reactors and Generation IV systems, many of which incorporate technological features that have not been widely used before. While these advancements hold promise for enhancing the benefits of nuclear energy, they also pose potential risks in terms of nuclear proliferation, particularly if not implemented with careful consideration.
One of the key concerns is the use of nuclear fuels with higher levels of uranium enrichment, which could bring them closer to being weapons-usable materials. Despite these concerns, these new reactor designs have garnered interest from numerous countries around the world, including both established nuclear energy users and those with little to no previous experience in nuclear energy. To address these challenges, technology developers and national regulators, with the support of international bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), must collaborate to ensure that all states can harness the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without exacerbating the risks of nuclear proliferation.
You have researched a wide range of topics in nuclear security and related fields. How does your work contribute to our understanding of nuclear security?
Ross: I am currently engaged in research on international nuclear disarmament alongside my colleague Dr Hassan Elbahtimy. We are exploring strategies to make nuclear disarmament more resistant to reversal. This involves developing frameworks to address various facilities involved in building and maintaining nuclear weapons, ranging from capping production to dismantling facilities. Recently, I have been focusing on the UK's nuclear weapons production complex, examining its components and potential actions against them in a disarmament scenario. In the narrow sense of nuclear security, my research focuses on safeguarding small modular reactors, advanced reactors, and floating nuclear power plants. These floating plants introduce unique challenges as they navigate international waters, intersecting with maritime laws and regulations. My aim is to identify and assess the risks associated with these challenges and propose mitigation strategies within the realm of nuclear security.
You have previously worked on strategic trade controls and intangible technology transfers. Why are these areas critical in the context of nuclear proliferation and international security?
Ross: My previous work on strategic trade controls and intangible technology transfers focuses on effectively managing the movement of goods, information, and knowledge between states, particularly when they have military relevance or applications. These areas are crucial in the context of nuclear proliferation and international security because they aim to prevent sensitive items, like designs for nuclear power plants or components. While not all users of controlled items have ill intentions, the potential misuse of such technology poses significant risks to international security. In the UK, for instance, a regime of strategic trade controls mandates exporters to obtain licenses from the government before exporting such items. This includes intangible technology, which encompasses information and knowledge necessary for operating, building, or repairing equipment subject to these controls.
Intangible technology poses a particular concern in this regard because it can be easily disseminated through digital channels, bypassing traditional physical export controls. Unlike physical goods, which are subject to inspection at customs, digital documents detailing sensitive technology can be transmitted quickly and discreetly, increasing the risk of proliferation. As a result, controlling intangible technology transfers becomes crucial in preventing the unauthorized spread of nuclear knowledge and enhancing global non-proliferation efforts.