Using a meeting of the Pobeda (Victory) organising committee, a Kremlin advisory body charged with promoting patriotism, the president thanked the Russian people for their support and trust. He declared that the amendments would improve the political system, consolidate social support, and strengthen the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its ‘spiritual, historical and moral values’. Russia’s revised constitution came into effect on July 4th, US Independence Day, prompting one commentator to speculate whether the date would be known in future as Russia’s Independence Day.
Reporting on the amendments has focused on the removal of the two-term limit for presidential terms, opening the door for Vladimir Putin to stay on as president for another 12 years if he stands in 2024. However, this move to significantly prolong his rule was inserted last-minute into a wide-ranging, random assortment of amendments covering 42 of the Russian Constitution’s 137 articles. The reforms include everything from the distribution of political power, to a new minimum wage, to disability rights, to environmental protections and to the shoring up of ‘Russian’ values. Indeed when Putin first unveiled the proposed changes in January 2020, he argued their aim was to improve state governance to better tackle the ‘economic, social and technological challenges’ facing Russia.
The consolidation of political power within the Kremlin represents the continuation of a long-running theme of Putin’s tenure, leading to a distinct lack of opposition and the weakening of local powers. What’s left of opposing critiques have unsurprisingly focused on this concentration of power in the hands of the executive, but the Kremlin’s strategy has been to focus on the wide-ranging changes contained in the amendments, such as the minimum wage, at a time when the effects of Covid-19 are starting to hurt Russia economically.
Another common theme Putin’s administration has exploited to justify greater powers, is the notion of Russia being vulnerable to external threats and the need for domestic stability. The perpetuation of a siege mentality enables the Russian leadership to take actions that may be unpopular internally, but which can be justified by reference to the country’s historical experience (particularly of invasion) and the narrative of adversaries always being ‘out there’, ready to exploit any weakness. As such, pro-Kremlin supporters have included the struggle against Covid-19 in this narrative, arguing that presidential powers should be expanded further to facilitate this ‘battle’.
However, despite the electoral success last week, the vote has suffered setbacks. It was originally scheduled to take place in early April and up until late March it looked like Putin would see his plans pushed through easily, but the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent restrictions necessitated a delay. The decision to then rush it through in July, rather than wait until September, signals the depth of concern within the Kremlin and beyond about the extent of the economic fallout from the combined effects of the pandemic and oil price crash, and how this may impact on support for Putin in the coming months.
Putin’s approval ratings have taken a hit over his handling of the crisis and are currently at around 60% from a high of over 80% in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. Now, more than ever, it is the economy that concerns ordinary Russians, with 73% anticipating a worsening of their financial situation in the near future, according to a recent poll. The unpopular pensions reforms introduced in 2018 undermined the social contract between the Russian government and ordinary citizens, who have begun to tire of the government’s focus on foreign policy issues such as the wars in Syria and Ukraine.
This shift from foreign to domestic policy concerns is reflected in recent polling from late June which shows that the newly appointed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin came top of the list of most trusted politicians, after Putin. He was the second highest rated politician, with 14%, the first time in recent years that the approval ratings for the prime minister were higher than for either the foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (8%) or defence minister Sergei Shoigu (12%).
If the health of the economy and nation continue to deteriorate in the face of Covid, in spite of his apparent victory last week, the coming months will present real challenges for Putin.
Dr Tracey German is currently Deputy Dean of Academic Studies (Research) at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London.