Against a backdrop of economic uncertainty due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and a post-Brexit re-set, the latest review of defence, this week’s announcement on the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (‘Integrated Review’ or ‘IR’), will ‘define the government’s vision for the UK’s role in the world over the next decade’. It will not only need to set out how the government aims to achieve its ‘Global Britain’ agenda by maintaining an ambitious foreign policy and military capability programme, but will also need to detail how security services will continue to be fit for purpose in an era of increasingly complex and diverse threats to the defence landscape, all the while within tight budgetary constraints.
A new paper, The Defence Review Dilemma: The British Experience, published today explores the British experience of Defence Reviews, the challenges and pitfalls governments have faced in tackling the ambition versus affordability dilemma and what this might suggest about the policy and spending announcements on defence made this week.
Boris Johnson’s ambition to deliver a ‘Global Britain’ implies that ‘hard power’ will remain an important tool of the government’s approach. Yet, the experience of past reviews suggests that there is a risk of difficult questions about the financing of defence and ensuring that the hard power provided by the armed forces is both sufficient to meet demand and flexible enough to address the range of risks confronting it.
Since the end of the Second World War, the United Kingdom has seen a dramatic decline in the amount of expenditure on defence. In 1952, a little over 11 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was spent on defence; just over 60 years later the proportion has fallen to around 2 per cent. This has understandably, brought about comparable reductions in the size of the UK’s armed forces, yet the desire of successive British governments to play a significant world role despite a mixture of financial difficulties and a desire to reapportion spending away from defence into other areas of the economy, has led to a consistent and uncomfortable imbalance between commitment and resources.
The first challenge facing any review is that of how British governments perceive the United Kingdom’s position in the world. There is a very clear theme throughout post‑war history of governments, be they Labour, Conservative or coalition, of the UK wanting to play a significant role in world affairs, as befitting a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and one of the G7 group of leading economic powers.
The reduction in Britain’s defence capabilities East of Suez during the 1960s provided a clear warning for policy makers about the possible risk to reputation caused by retrenchment. The cancellation of new aircraft carriers and a huge reduction in the UK’s presence in Singapore and Malaysia was a source of much angst to President Lyndon Johnson’s administration and key allies in the Far East.
More recently the move towards Network Enabled Capability, first presaged in the Blair government’s Strategic Defence Review in 1998, suggests that temptations for ‘quick wins’ by removing extant capabilities to bring new technology into mainstream, risks creating gaps which reduce not only capability but potentially credibility in the eyes of partner nations.
The implication here is that while the temptation to make reductions to the defence budget by removing capabilities which are thought to be on the verge of obsolescence is obvious, it may not in fact be in the best interests of the UK’s defence posture. As Sir John Nott, who presided over the 1981 defence review, suggests: